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Abstract 
 
There is ongoing and wide-ranging dispute over the proliferation of childhood behaviour disorders.  
In particular, the veracity of the category Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), has 
been the subject of considerable scepticism.  With no end to the debate in sight, it will be argued 
here that the problem might effectively be approached, not by addressing the specific features of 
ADHD itself, but rather by a philosophical analysis of one of the terms around which this entire 
problem revolves: that is, the notion of truth.  If we state: “It is true that ADHD is a real disorder”, 
what exactly do we mean?  Do we mean that it is an objective fact of nature?  Do we mean that it 
fits seamlessly with other sets of ideas and explanations? Or do we simply mean that it works as an 
idea in a practical sense?  This paper will examine the relationship between some of the dominant 
models of truth, and the assertions made by those in the field of ADHD.  Specifically, the paper 
will contrast the claim that ADHD is a real disorder, with the claim that ADHD is a product of 
social governance.  The intention is, first, to place some significant qualifications upon the validity 
of the truth-claims made by ADHD advocates, and second, to re-emphasise the potential and 
promise of philosophical investigation in providing productive new ways of thinking about some 
obstinate and seemingly intractable educational problems.   
 
Introduction: differences of opinion on ADHD 
 
Theories: Four stages of acceptance: 1) this is worthless nonsense; 2) this is an 
interesting, but perverse point of view; 3) this is true, but quite unimportant; 4) I‟ve 
always said so. (Haldane, 1963: 464) 
 
If this paper were to be on the subject of dyslexia, chances are it would be rather short, as there 
now seems to be little debate over its veracity as a category.  Dyslexia is now deemed to exist in an 
objective sense, in that it is regarded as an unfortunate neurological problem which affects the way 
visual information is carried to the brain, resulting in a range of learning difficulties for a small 
percentage of the population.  Currently, there appear to be no competing psychological theories to 
explain why these particular children struggle to read in the way they do.  Of course, thirty years 
ago, such theories did exist … they weren‟t very bright, or very motivated.  However, a new 
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theory evolved - mostly likely following the four stages outlined above—and now the truth of 
dyslexia appears to be cemented into contemporary scientific and pedagogic discourse.   
 
In contrast, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), which is primarily a theory 
concerning the misbehaviour of children, has yet to reach the status of  „established truth‟, in spite 
of what its advocates may claim.  Debates continue not only within the pages of learned journals, 
but also in the popular media, where various treatments and protocols of diagnosis are discussed 
alongside the arguments of those who refuse to recognise the disorder at all.  Those interested in 
the issue of AHDH appear to have clustered into three main camps, each with its own 
theory/theories.   
 
The first camp consists of ADHD‟s true believers (Theory 1).  There is now a huge literature on 
various aspects of the disorder (its aetiology, its central characteristics, different methodologies for 
intervention) written from within any number of different disciplines (medicine, neurobiology, 
psychology, biochemistry, pedagogy, jurisprudence, to name but a few).  These knowledges 
largely take ADHD to be an objective truth, an aberration of the human mind finally uncovered by 
the keen eye of contemporary science.  As Haldane‟s model predicts, the theory that large number 
of children might be misbehaving because of a neurological disorder called ADHD was initially 
regarded as worthless nonsense, only to be triumphally uncovered as the truth three stages later.   
 
The science speaks for itself … it's a real disorder; it's valid … Many people in the public 
ask, “Where were these kids when I was growing up?  I‟ve never heard of this before.” Well 
… back then we didn‟t have a professional label for them.  We preferred to think of them in 
moral terms.  They were the lazy kids, the no-good kids, the dropouts, the delinquents, the 
layabout ne‟er-do-wells who were doing nothing with their life.  Now we know better. Now 
we know that it is a real disability, that it is a valid condition … (Barkley, 2001, interview) 
 
The second camp consists of those who think that ADHD may exist, but that if it does, consider 
that it has been wildly over-diagnosed (Theory 2).  The problem here is that the diagnosis of 
ADHD is entirely subjective.  Breggin (1998:138) points out that there are no physical symptoms, 
neurological signs, blood tests, brain scan findings nor chemical imbalances which can verify that 
a child has ADHD. Consequently, it is up individual doctors/psychologists/teachers to decide who 
may or may not have the disorder, and given the relative ease with which Ritalin pacifies 
troublesome children, it is perhaps not surprising that this “magic pill” has become so incredibly 
popular (Jacobs, 2002:44).  Also, given that its central function is to stimulate concentration, 
research suggests Ritalin is being used by middle-class parents as a way of artificially boosting 
their children‟s academic performance (Carle, 2000).  
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Finally, the third camp consists of those who do not accept the objective „truth‟ of ADHD.  This 
camp is itself made up of three positions:  
 The first position that ADHD is a fiction, or more specifically, a fraud (Theory 3).  A number 
of writers have argued that the disorder is largely the invention pharmaceutical giants such as 
Ciba-Geigy (Armstrong, 1997), who have the largest share of a market in cures estimated at 
$670 million (US) annually (Magill-Lewis, 2000).   
 The second position is that, rather than being an objective and valid disorder, ADHD is simply 
an amalgam of normal childhood behaviours, and as such, is not a fraud, but is rather simply a 
mistake, a spurious invention (Theory 4).  For example, Goodman (1992) contends that the 
disorder is mostly a disorganised jumble of often-contradictory characteristics and causes 
which do not cohere effectively into any kind of valid or consistent entity.   
 The third position questioning the objective validity of ADHD contends that the advent of such 
disorders is not best understood in terms of either fraud or error, but rather in the rise of 
differentiating forms of government (Theory 5).  That is, by the sub-division of the population 
into an exponentially increasing number of categories, it becomes possible to regulate conduct 
to an ever-finer degree.  This does not just include the most obvious external manifestations of 
docility and discipline (Foucault, 1977), but with the rise of the psy-disciplines, also the 
smallest working of the human mind (Rose, 1990).  ADHD is therefore best understood not as 
an isolated issue, a single bounded natural category/truth to be identified and rectified, but 
rather as one of over three hundred (at latest count) categories/truths of childhood difference 
(Whitefield, 1999), each with its own specific characteristics, forms of intervention, and 
prognosis.  This position has been discussed at length elsewhere (Tait, 2001).  
(A breakdown of the various camps and their associated theories can be seen in figure 1 below). 
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Theory 1:
ADHD is real;
it exists in nature.
Camp 1:
YES
Theory 2:
ADHD may exist, but
in far fewer numbers.
Camp 2:
MAYBE
Theory 3:
ADHD is a fraud.
Theory 4:
ADHD is a mistake.
Theory 5:
ADHD is the product
of social governance.
Camp 3:
NO
Is it true that ADHD is a real disorder?
 
           (Figure 1) 
All this raises an interesting question.  Are those with an interest in ADHD logically compelled to 
pick of the five theories and say, “This is the truth.  All those who do not agree with this position 
are wrong,” or is it possible for two seemingly mutually exclusive theories both to be true?  Of the 
five mentioned, some theory-pairs can be discounted immediately—not in terms of their truth-
value, but in terms of whether theories that conflict with them can also be true.  For example, 
Theory 1: “ADHD is real, it exist in nature” cannot coexist with either Theory 3, “ADHD is a 
fraud”, or Theory 4, “ADHD is a mistake”, as both are simply rebuttals of the first statement, and 
it is generally taken as a logical truism that a ≠ not a.  Similarly, Theory 2, “ADHD may exist, but 
it has been wildly over-diagnosed” is something of an agnostic position, in that it cedes that 
possibility of either of the other theories actually being true.   
 
Therefore, for the purposes of this paper the focus falls on Theory 1 and Theory 5, two theories 
representing opposing sides of an ongoing debate, a debate characterised by each side saying that 
the other is in error.  This argument would normally be summarised as follows:  
1) Both Theory 1 and Theory 5 make truth-claims implying the other is false. 
2) Both Theory 1 and Theory 5 have mobilised sufficient evidence to make truth claims. 
3) Theory 1 and Theory 5 cannot both be correct. 
4) Therefore, either Theory 1 or Theory 5 is false. 
However, rather than being forced to make a determination between these theories, an alternative 
possibility is that both might be true. That is, can “ADHD is real, it exists in nature” and “ADHD 
is the product of social governance” both be true, when (while not being direct negations of each 
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other, as before), it can be inferred that the other is false?—from within the contextual logic of 
each position.   
 
What is being suggested here is that it is possible that the heart of this problem lies not with the 
disease entity ADHD in itself, but rather in precisely what we mean when we say that something is 
true.  After all, if this preliminary question—Can both theories be true?—is be answered 
effectively, then it may possible to address the dilemma forming the core this paper in a more 
thoughtful and productive way, that is: “Is ADHD a real disorder?”   
 
Philosophical Approaches to the Notion of Truth 
 
What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer. (Bacon, 1601, 1) 
 
There is probably no other word in the English language which carries as much symbolic, 
metaphysical, and romantic baggage as truth.  Henkin (1966: 1), the American philosopher, states: 
“The word „truth‟, as well as such words as „beauty‟ and „justice‟, refer to concepts so broad, and 
so deeply stirring to the human spirit, that some have set them as the aim of life.”  Indeed, truth has 
been not only been described as providing the principal foundation of the aforementioned beauty 
(Keats, 1820) and justice (Disraeli, 1851), but also virtue (Holyoake, 1902), knowledge (Russell, 
1912), subjectivity (Kierkegaard, 1844), and even human nature itself (Bacon, 1601).  
Significantly, it has also been described as the sole purpose of philosophy (Bierce, 1911).   
 
Truth is not a simple matter.  Philosophers have struggled over the notion since the ancient debate 
between Socrates and Protagoras, and in many ways, this argument has yet to be resolved.  
Socrates, as given voice by Plato, believed in the existence of absolute standards, standards having 
reality independent of human action or perception.  This is not to say that feelings, attitudes, biases 
and preconceptions are irrelevant in the process of constructing truth, however, once these are 
stripped away—ie. by the kind of critical reasoning espoused by Socrates himself—then it would 
be possible to know the truth (Plato, 1956).  Plato famously used the analogy of the cave to explain 
his position, where he proposed that, for the most part, reality is like the shadows cast on a wall in 
front of people who were never allowed to look around towards the cave entrance.  Plato suggested 
that true knowledge can only be obtained by rejecting such false appearances, and forcing oneself 
to leave the safety and security of the cave, and address the real objects themselves, not just their 
shadows (1974).  Within the logic of this analogy, advocates of ADHD would regard previous 
educators as having long stared at shadows on a cave wall, shadows telling the story of naughty 
and underachieving children, seemingly destined to fail in school.  Only by turning around, and 
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emerging from the cave into the light, squinting, was it finally possible to see the real truth of 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder—a real fact of nature, just waiting to be discovered.   
 
This understanding of truth is most frequently labelled as a realist approach.  Henry James (1917: 
233) summarises this view by pointing to its reliance upon the notion of a “world complete in 
itself, to which thought comes as a passive mirror”.  It certainly constitutes the most familiar and 
widely used understanding of the relationship between ourselves and the world in which we live, 
and as will be discussed in greater detail shortly, the vast majority of science also appears to be 
based upon this logic.  This is not, however, the only version of truth available to us.  There also 
exists an anti-realist approach that can also boast a long history and a formidable theoretical 
foundation.   
 
Lined up against Socrates in Ancient Greece were a group of itinerant teachers called Sophists, the 
most eminent of whom was Protagoras, who famously stated that “Man is the measure of all 
things” (Plato, 1974: 160).  Sophists such as Protagoras believed that finding absolute and 
unequivocal truth was impossible, and hence man had to learn to live, and construct knowledge, in 
its absence.  Gorgias, a peer of Protagoras, gave the definitive statement of this logic when he 
claimed: “nothing exists, and if it did, no one could know it, and if they knew it, no-one could 
communicate it.‟ (Sextus Empiricus, 1994).  It is an extension of this belief which eventually led to 
the empiricism of Locke, Berkley and Hume beginning in the seventeenth century, ie. the 
conviction that since knowledge, in the strictest sense, appears to be unobtainable, then all that 
remains is the possibility of extrapolating knowledge from our sense data.   
 
However, the anti-realist position has implication for the notion of truth which extend beyond 
these epistemological limitations.  These implications are most clearly articulated by Friedrich 
Nietzsche, probably the greatest opponent, not only of realist understandings of truth, but also of 
the kind of anti-absolutism that eventually gave rise to Existentialism.  Nietzsche (1954: 46) asks:  
“What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms—in short, a 
sum of human relations…” His point here is that truths are formed, shaped and deployed within 
social contexts.  The truth is not „out there‟, waiting to be discovered, but is rather something that 
is brought into existence by force of the human will (Nietzsche, 1967).   
 
Nietzsche‟s approach to truth forms a crucial component in the work of many subsequent thinkers, 
specifically in relation to the exercise of power.  Like Nietzsche, Michel Foucault also proposes 
that truth is something that cannot exist in absolute terms, contending instead that there are a 
variety of truths, constructed within definite contexts as the product of specific legitimated 
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knowledges. Therefore, because truth is actually the product of legitimated knowledges, as those 
knowledges change, then so too will truth (Foucault, 1980:131).  Different societies produce 
different regimes of truth, and the production of these regimes is internal to the exercise of power.  
Truth is therefore: 
 
A system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation 
and operation of statements. „Truth‟ is linked in a circular relation with systems of 
power which produce and sustain it, and to the effects of power which it induces and 
which extend it. A „regime‟ of truth. (Foucault, 1980:132) 
 
Returning to the cave metaphor, Nietzsche and Foucault would therefore regard the „discovery‟ of 
ADHD upon stepping out into the light, not as the unveiling of the real truth, founded upon 
unambiguous facts stripped of any error or misunderstanding, but rather as simply another play of 
shadows, another interpretation of a previous interpretation relocated to a different conceptual 
domain.  After all, as Nietzsche  (1965: 40) states: “there are no facts, only interpretations”.   
 
These two generalised positions outlined above—the realist and anti-realist—while representing 
the primary philosophical subdivision over the issue of truth, by no means provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the field.  As can be seen in Figure 2, the two approaches spawn a 
number of other, more specific, theories concerning the nature of truth, and it is only by an 
analysis of these theories that it becomes possible to address the nature of the truth claims made by 
the conflicting approaches to ADHD.   
 
* Theory has associated
    truth-test
Eg. Bertrand Russell
Correspondence Theory*
"Realists"
Eg. Gottlob Frege
.
Deflationary Theory
"Non-Epistemic"
Eg. Hilary Putnam
Coherence Theory*
Eg. William James
Pragmatic theory*
"Epistemic"
"Anti-Realists"
What is Truth?
 
 
            (Figure 2) 
 
However, addressing the nature of the claims made by these theories of truth, ultimately involves 
applying those theories to the problem at hand.  Leaving aside the deflationary theory (which may 
better be described as an anti-theory of truth), the three remaining theories are not simply abstract 
categories of interpretation which satisfy particular ontological and epistemological curiosities.  
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All three theories are actually useful, in that they translate directly into truth-tests.  A truth test is a 
device for checking particular statements and assessing whether they are true or false.  As will be 
shown, any statement making a fact-claim—such as Theory 1 and Theory 5—can have their 
veracity checked against one, or all, of the three tests. 
 
Realism and Truth 
The truth does not change according to our ability to stomach it (Flannery O‟Connor) 
 
In the book Truth in Context, Michael Lynch (1998) describes realism about truth as being based 
upon the understanding that truth is based upon how the world is, not upon what we think about 
that world.  Thus, it should make no difference as to who conducts an investigation into the nature 
of the world, the truth will always be the same, regardless of how different they may be or how 
different their domain assumptions.  A logical extension of this position is that all systems of 
knowledge—philosophical, religious, aesthetic, and in particular, scientific—should be directed 
towards the uncovering of this truth.  Indeed, he cites Stephen Hawkings, who makes this very 
point when he states that “the eventual goal of science is to provide a single theory that describes 
the whole universe.” (Hawkins, cited in Lynch, 1998:10)  According to this model, ADHD 
therefore is a fact of human genetics, accessible to researchers irrespective of their background, 
and existing whether we choose to acknowledge it or not.  To put this assertion another way: the 
statement „ADHD is a real disorder‟ is true because it corresponds to an external reality.  This 
example provides the theoretical underpinning for the realist position on truth, that is, something is 
true if it corresponds to the facts.  This is called correspondence theory.   
 
Correspondence Theory 
The word „truth‟ … denotes the conformity of thought with its object. (Descartes, 1639: 597) 
 
The first formulation of what later became correspondence theory is normally attributed to 
Aristotle, who stated in Metaphysics (IV, 7, 1011b25), “To say of what is that is not or of what is 
not that is, is false, while to say of what is that is, or of what is not that is not, is true.”  This has 
often been paraphrased as, “A statement is true if, as it signifies, so it is.”  Aristotle is thereby 
comparing what is said about reality, with reality itself, and if there is a match, the statement can 
be said to be true.  However, correspondence theory, as it is currently understood, is generally 
attributed to Bertrand Russell (1912: 74), who states, “A belief is true when it corresponds to a 
certain associated complex, and false when it does not.”  This definition leads Russell to argue that 
truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs, and although a world of mere matter (ie. containing 
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no beliefs) would therefore contain no truth or falsehood, these beliefs are dependent upon the 
relations of beliefs to other things, not upon any internal quality of the beliefs.  Thus, Russell is 
firmly anchoring correspondence theory in a realist understanding of truth.  
 
The central appeal of correspondence theory is its self-evidence, in that it seems to support a basic 
human perception as to the nature of truth.  Furthermore, since it rules out it human interpretive 
agency from the process, it objectively delineates the true from the false, thereby further adding to 
its apparent clarity and utility.  For those who take up this position, it becomes possible to argue 
that once the direct link to “reality” is removed from the truth equation—as with anti-realism—
then it becomes possible that anything might be true (a contention which will be discussed in 
greater detail later).   
 
However, the fact that the rigor and validity of correspondence theory appears to be self-evident, 
does not necessarily make it so.  One criticism of the theory is that having stripped away the 
rhetoric of “obviousness” from this model, there appears to be little in the way of conceptual 
foundation.  Paul Horwich (1990: 1) makes precisely this point when he states: “The common-
sense notion that truth is a kind of „correspondence with the facts‟ has never been worked out to 
anyone‟s satisfaction.  Even its advocates would concede that it remains little more than a vague, 
guiding intuition”.  A second, and more thoroughgoing, criticism is more epistemological in 
nature, in that it returns to problems of gaining knowledge about a mind-independent reality from 
our own sense data.  As Christian (1983: 193-194) notes, correspondence theory: 
 
…compares a concept with a set of sensations—the sensations we use when we go 
about inferring what exists in the real world.  Therefore, we are checking a subjective 
concept with a subjective set of sensations.  If they match to some tolerable degree, 
then we call the concept true; if they don‟t, we call it false.  This is not really a happy 
condition to live with, but given our present knowledge of the cognitive processes, the 
predicament seems inescapable.  It looks as thought … we can never be certain of 
anything 
 
Therefore, according to logic of correspondence theory, Theory 1 regarding ADHD is true because 
a mental concept—the notion of a disorder called ADHD dealing with hyperactive conduct—
matches with sets of sense data gathered from the real world, data involving the observation and 
measurement of hyperactive children.  It is therefore concluded that ADHD exists in that real 
world.  However, a further problem arises when it is pointed out that there is always a possibility 
that more than one mental concept can fit the relevant data, thereby producing more than one truth.  
For example; Theory 5 argues that set of mental concepts—the notion of social governance 
through the proliferation of categories of difference, such as ADHD—also matches with sets of 
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sense data gathered from the real world.  At this point, logic would suggest that the existence of 
more than one truth for a single reality must prove to be either a fatal flaw for one of the truths (ie. 
either Theory 1 or Theory 5), or if not, for the entire realist position on truth itself.   
 
That said, correspondence theory has still been the dominant paradigm, not only in terms of 
common usage, but also within almost all scientific discourse, including those responsible for the 
production of ADHD.  However, the mechanisms by which science has attempted to come to 
terms with the notion of truth, have resulted in the unearthing of a number of equally obstinate and 
seemingly intractable problems.   
 
Science and Truth 
Generally regarded as arriving around the time of the Enlightenment in the 17
th
 century, 
modernity is most frequently characterised as an era dominated by the underpinning belief that, 
through the use of reason, it would be possible to solve the many problems of humanity.  Not 
only were we now to be responsible for our own collective destinies, free finally of the religious 
dictates that had previously determined our fates, but with its mantra of truth, objectivity and 
progress, the dark ages had ended, modernity had arrived, along with its greatest advocate and 
exemplar—science.  This depiction should sound familiar since, with the exception of a few 
notable heretics (who will be discussed shortly), science has long been its own best publicist, 
cordoning off the rights to the production of truth, and anointing itself as the vanguard of 
society‟s inexorable journey into a better future.   
 
The scientific method was first outlined by Francis Bacon in 1620 in his book Novum Organum.  
His theory is premised upon the belief that the general aim of science is to push back the boundary 
between what is known and what is not known.  This process is begun by scientists, who observe 
and record many examples of an event during the course of an experiment, thereby adding to the 
stock of knowledge around a particular subject.  Eventually, as each scientist adds information to 
the totality, general rules emerge.  Theories are then advanced which explain the existing pattern of 
events and can be used to predict future happenings of the same event, and by combining these 
theories, global laws are constructed.  Thus, a limited number of experimental results become 
extrapolated into “laws of nature”.  The central principle here, that of “induction”, suggests that 
assumptions can be made about all members of a class from examining a few members of the 
class.  For example, if enough researchers correlate the taking of Ritalin with improvements in the 
conduct of children diagnosed with ADHD, then the conclusion can be drawn about the truth of the 
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underpinning scientific assumptions.  It is this form of inductive logic which constitutes the 
bedrock of the scientific method.  
 
Unfortunately, inductive reasoning has a major flaw, first pointed out by David Hume in 1737 in 
his Treatise of Human Nature.  He argued that assumptions cannot be made about all members of a 
class from examining a few members of that class.  No matter how many times a specific “cause 
A” is followed by “effect B”, it does not logically follow that A will always cause B.  As Bertrand 
Russell (1912: 35) notes, “The man who has fed a chicken every day throughout its life at last 
wrings its neck instead, showing that more refined views as to the uniformity of nature would have 
been useful to the chicken.”  Karl Popper (1963) argues that the consequences of this observation 
for the nexus between science and truth are severe, as it becomes impossible to prove anything as 
true, no matter how many times an event occurs.  Therefore, science should give up its quest for 
truth by attempting to prove a phenomenon to be true, rather scientists should try to disprove 
existing theories, thereby creating new theories, theories that will, in turn, be disproved.  
Advancement in science is thereby not by proving truth, but being unable to prove it false.  All 
truth then becomes transient, being surpassed in time by a different truth that can account for both 
the new data, as well as the information that spawned the previous theory.  However, while 
forming the basis for a rigorous critique of the vast majority of science, a position such as Popper‟s 
does not necessarily mean a necessary rejection of the realist approach to truth.  As Chalmers 
(1976: 114) observes: 
 
A falsificationist who is a realist will acknowledge the fallibility of all science and will 
admit that we can never know any of our scientific theories constitute a true 
explanation or description of the behaviour of some aspects of the world.  Nevertheless, 
he (sic) will insist that it is aim of science to attain true descriptions or explanations and 
he will argue that science constantly progresses towards that aim.  Science approaches 
ever closer to truth.   
 
Therefore, even though science is terminally flawed, vis-à-vis uncovering truth, truth is still out 
there to be uncovered, and the scientific method is still probably the best method available.  Other 
philosophers of science are not as convinced. For example, Paul Feyerabend suggests that a 
number of qualifications should be placed upon the claims made by science, three of which are 
worthy of mention here.  First, he argues that science is merely an ideology—more pervasive and 
successful that other existing ideologies, but an ideology nevertheless (Feyerabend, 1978).  
Analogous to the right that once belonged religion, science now exists in a conceptual framework 
that bestows upon it the sole legitimate right to contemporary truth-formation.  Furthermore, the 
ideology of science is compulsory (all children must be taught science), exclusory (other truth-
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building systems are debarred/ridiculed) and undemocratic (if and when scientific institutions 
finally agree ADHD is a real disorder, it will therefore exist).  
 
Second, Feyerabend argues that the relatively uncritical acceptance of scientific truths is based 
upon a belief in its infallibility, in that it can be separated from all other ideologies—religion, 
myth, superstition, tradition—by the notion that it can prove its claims.  Science is not seen as 
requiring any form of faith for its operation, it is simply regarded as the most efficient means 
available for “uncovering” truth, based in the “fair, rigorous and controlled” scientific method.  
However, Feyerabend argues that there is no realistic evidence to demonstrate that the scientific 
method has any more validity than do the standards that underlie the practice of magic 
(Feyerabend, 1981)—given that the “rigorous” scientific method is, in practical terms, generally 
nebulous collection of rules and procedures, applied unevenly and pragmatically, and 
“supplemented by unscientific methods and unscientific results” (Feyerabend, 1978: 105).  
Arguable, ADHD is a perfect case in point.  There is no fixed aetiology, and one doctor may 
diagnose ADHD whereas another may not, depending solely upon observations of particular kinds 
of conduct manifest at particular moments—the only tests for the disorder being questionnaires 
about behaviour completed by parents or teachers “whose frustration with the child prompted the 
doctor visit in the first place” (Jacobs, 2002: 10).  
 
Finally, science is a social process, and the truths it produces are forged within specific social 
contexts.  Feyerabend is far from alone in making these assertions.  Harry Collins (1985) also 
challenges the common assumption that scientific endeavours are somehow independent from 
human intentionality, contending instead that social factors exert a considerable influence upon the 
nature, course and eventual success of a scientific theory.  To make his case, he demonstrates the 
importance of networks of communication between academics, the tacit knowledge necessary to 
succeed in certain areas, the mechanics by which one theory gains ascendency over another, and 
also the falsehood of the notion of repeatability.  Similarly, Michael Mulkay (1979) argues that a 
theory becomes accepted not only as a result of technical evidence, but also because of the social 
resources that an individual or theoretical position can mobilise.  Even ADHD‟s staunchest 
advocates would admit that the diagnosis/disorder has flourished due, in part, to the intellectual, 
financial and political support given by Ciba-Geigy (now Novartis), the makers of Ritalin. 
 
This final point constitutes a central element in Thomas Kuhn‟s (1962) seminal text The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions.  Kuhn argued that changes in dominant scientific beliefs do not equate to 
a smooth path of discovery and progress.  Rather, science tends to lurch from one paradigm to 
another, generally when new results arise which do not fit the old model.  If these anomalies 
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persist, eventually a scientific revolution occurs, the old system crumbles and a new paradigm is 
constructed.  Two points are of importance here; first, tacit knowledge at work in given scientific 
communities is fundamental to the process of change, ie. scientific revolutions do not occur solely 
on the basis of discovered truths—far from it.  Second, there is little evidence to suggest that 
scientific knowledge is slowly approaching a better description of what the “real” world is like.  
Rather, science requires an underpinning teleological ideology for its legitimacy.  As Kuhn (1962: 
206-207) notes: 
 
I do not doubt … that Newton‟s mechanics improves on Aristotle‟s and that Einstein‟s 
improves on Newton‟s as an instrument for puzzle-solving.  But I can see in their 
succession no coherent direction of ontological development.  On the contrary, in some 
important respects, though by no means in all, Einstein‟s general theory of relativity is 
closer to Aristotle‟s than either of them is to Newton‟s.  
  
In summary then, a realist understanding of truth can be described as the approximation of thought 
to reality.  This perception is generally operationalised in the form of correspondence theory, 
which in turn forms the conceptual basis for the vast majority of scientific research. 
Correspondence theory is, however, not without its critics, and its adoption would most likely 
mean that Theory 1, “ADHD is real, it exists in nature” and Theory 5, “ADHD is the product of 
social governance” cannot both be true.  It is at this point that a truth test would be applied to see 
which of the two theories is right, and which is wrong (unless it is decided that neither is true).   
 
The Correspondence Truth Test 
This simply involves comparing a mental concept with an actual event, which can be done in a 
number of direct ways, such as by listening, by looking, by feeling, and so on.  For example, if the 
statement is, “It‟s a sunny day”, this can easily be checked by walking outside and looking: if the 
sun is shining, if it is warm, and if the are not many clouds in the sky, then the statement will 
probably be accepted as true—although correspondence is always a matter of degree, and the more 
clouds there are in the sky, the less the correspondence, and the less likely the statement is to be 
categorised as true.  Importantly, all forms of direct comparison between statement and event 
would come under this truth test.   
 
Employing the correspondence test to check the truth of Theory 1 presents a number of difficulties.  
ADHD is not a physical object that can be held up for public scrutiny and compared to the 
subjective concept of the disorder.  Rather it is an amalgam of various types of data—statistical, 
observational, behavioural, pharmacological, experiential, educational—which have been 
assembled in a piecemeal fashion to the point where their combined presence is deemed to 
 13 
correspond to the existence of an objective disorder.  Although this is not particularly convincing, 
in many ways its does not differ from most other forms of science.  For example, “seeing” the path 
of an electron through a vapour chamber is not to see the electron, but rather to see events which 
are connected, via an often-long chain of dissociated reasoning, to the existence of a particular 
moving particle.  It is a brave realist who makes the ontological leap of saying that one is the other.  
However, one significant difference between “seeing” ADHD and “seeing” an electron‟s path, is 
the degree of agreement within the scientific community as to whether that is actually what is 
being seen.  The agnostic section as the scientific community (as represented by Theory 2 detailed 
earlier) still remain unconvinced that what is being delineated, and then compared to the subjective 
concept, actually constitutes the coherent and objective facticity labelled as ADHD. 
 
Using the correspondence test with Theory 5 is also fraught with problems.  Seeing social 
governance is not as simple as stepping outside and seeing whether it is sunny.  Social governance 
is comprised of, and is operationalised through, an almost infinite number of bits of information—
in this case, largely historical, statistical, administrative, cultural, medical, and legal—all of which 
combine to within a given theoretical framework to produce a particular truth.  This truth positions 
ADHD, not as an objective fact of nature, but rather as a governmental product formed in a given 
historical and medical context, along with a myriad of other new behaviour disorders which also 
have their genesis within the wider processes of differentiating government.  Claiming a 
correspondence between this version of ADHD (ie. the statement “ADHD is a product of social 
governance) and objective reality is a complex and piecemeal process, but arguable no less so that 
that associated with taking ADHD at face value.  
 
In summary, the correspondence truth test appears incapable of providing definitive proof of the 
truth of either Theory 1 or Theory 5, although there appears to be less dispute over the latter than 
the former from within the communities of people responsible for their respective formulations.  
However, this lack of certainty should not be regarded as a fatal shortcoming to either theory, since 
the fact is most science struggles in similar ways with correspondence theory.  Interestingly, there 
does seem to be an irony in the fact that those researchers who adopt a realist understanding of 
ADHD, and who advocate a direct correspondence between the mental concept and the physical 
reality, are probably least able to use the correspondence test to make their case effectively.   
 
Anti-Realism and Truth 
There are no eternal facts as there are no absolute truths. (Nietzsche, 1878: 12)  
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In contrast to the realist position on truth (a position based upon the belief that there exist 
indisputable facts about a singular reality), the anti-realist position argues that facts themselves 
necessarily reflect particular points of view.  The central animating assumption is that it is 
impossible to describe an ontological fact in the absence of a conceptual framework.  Lynch (1998: 
23) characterises this position as being founded upon the postulation that, “There is no scheme-
neutral way of making a report about the world.  It would be a mistake to search for the scheme 
that tells it like it „really‟ is—there is no such thing.”  Putnam (1981) argues that in the absence of 
a “God‟s Eye” point of view—which many would argue is the unspoken prerequisite of realism—
all that can remain are various interpretations of how the world is.   
  
ADHD provides an effective example of this reasoning.  As has been discussed, the realist 
approach to truth leads to the conclusion that it is either a fact about reality, or is not a fact about 
reality, that ADHD exists.  This absolute knowledge, either for or against, is ascertainable via 
approximations to the “God‟s Eye” point of view.  To put it another way, science may not be 
“God‟s Eye”, but it gets close to it, and will get ever closer.  In contrast, the anti-realist would 
argue that the “God‟s Eye” viewpoint is not just unobtainable, but in fact an illusion which both 
inflates the boundaries of what can be regarded as true, as well as fundamentally distorts the nature 
of truth itself.  Therefore, claims about the existence of ADHD can never be made with absolute 
certainty, however it is possible to say that they appear to be true within the logical parameters of 
particular types of knowledge.   
 
According to Lynch (1998), this latter position is based upon what he refers to as metaphysical 
pluralism.  This is the belief that reality is tolerant of more than one description of its nature.  
Reality does not come “ready made and complete” as realists would have us believe, but rather is 
shaped by our own interpretations of it.  Consequently,  
 
…there can be a plurality of incompatible, but equally acceptable, conceptual schemes.  
These conceptual schemes are ways of dividing reality into objects and kinds of 
objects; they are ways of categorising the world.  The pluralist intuition is that the 
world does not dictate to us which of these ways of categorising is the best, the most 
correct, or the way the world really is “in itself”.  The pluralist denies that there are any 
absolute facts about an ultimate reality; facts themselves reflect our conceptual point of 
view.  
 
It should be pointed out here that accepting anti-realist accounts of truth does not necessitate a 
slide into radical relativism.  Truth does not become so nebulous that it can be found anywhere, 
and admitting the truth is intimately associated with experience is not the same as suggesting that, 
as a consequence, all conceptual schemes are equally valid.  As Putnam (1981: 54) wryly observes, 
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“If anyone believed that, and if they were foolish enough to pick a conceptual scheme that told 
them they could fly and act upon it by jumping out the window, they would, if they were lucky 
enough to survive, see the weakness of the latter view at once”. 
 
Anti-realist theories of truth comes in three main forms, each of which has different implications.  
The first, deflationary theory, is non-epistemological in nature, unlike the two which follow.  That 
is, deflationary theory does not found it explanation of truth with human conceptual schema.  
Rather, it seeks to portray the problem of the real nature of truth as a pseudo-problem, one which 
will go away if it is ignored.   
 
Deflationary Theory 
There is no separate problem of truth but merely a linguistic muddle. (Ramsey, 1927: 142) 
 
The symbolic significance of the quest for the nature of truth should not be underestimated.  
Indeed, when Bierce (1911) posited the discovery of truth as the sole purpose of philosophy, as 
mentioned earlier, he was simply echoing sentiments expressed by Aristotle two thousand years 
before.  With this in mind, it is relatively rare within the discipline of philosophy for anyone to 
claim the absolute solution to a problem, let alone one as long-standing and seemingly axiomatic 
as that concerning the nature of truth.  However, this is precisely the claim advanced by 
deflationary theorists. 
 
When the statement is made, “It is true that ADHD is a real disorder”, a deflationary theorist such 
as Gottlob Frege (1918) would argue that the content is identical with the statement “ADHD is a 
real disorder.‟  Therefore, ascribing the property of truth adds nothing to the thought that ADHD is 
a real disorder.  That is, truth stands for nothing within a sentence, other than purposes of assertion 
or negation, and is hence not a genuine concept (Ayer, 1935).  As Horwich (1990: 5) notes:   
 
… the traditional attempt to discern the essence of truth—to analyse that special quality 
which all truths supposedly have in common—is just a pseudo-problem based on 
syntactic overgeneralisation.  Unlike most other properties, being true is unsusceptible 
to conceptual or scientific analysis.  No wonder that its “underlying nature” has so 
stubbornly resisted philosophical elaboration; for there simply is no such thing.  
 
The central advantage of deflationary theory is it avoids the metaphysical baggage of some of its 
competitors.  There is no mystery to solve within the notion of truth, no hidden complexity that 
requires unravelling, and no requirement for a leap of faith into Kant‟s noumenal world.  The 
ascription of truth to a proposition serves a particular grammatical function, nothing more.  As a 
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consequence of these simplifying benefits, deflationary theory has continued to garner significant 
philosophical support, however it has frequently been pointed out that the theory lacks any element 
of the “correspondence intuition” that drives animates most other theories of truth—either directly 
or indirectly—and as such, will always be widely regarded as inadequate. 
 
Pragmatic Theory 
… the idea that works is the true one. (Christian, 1981: 199) 
 
Pragmatism is normally associated with the work of William James (1911), and follows the logic 
that theorising—whether about truth, or anything else for that matter—is a pointless activity in and 
of itself.  The only relevance that theorising can have is when it is converted into the solution of 
concrete intellectual problems.  A philosopher must ask, what is the practical worth of any 
particular claim?  That is, what difference would it make if a set of claims were believed to be 
either true or false?  If the answer is “none whatsoever”, then the issue should be of no 
philosophical interest.   
 
The sequela of this domain assumption is that the only reason we have for asserting that something 
is true, is if it works.  If an explanation can be translated into a verifiable and predictable 
outcome—an observable effect—then that explanation is true, if not, then the explanation is either 
false, or irrelevant, or both.   
 
Pragmatism asks its usual question. “Grant an idea or a belief to be true,” it says, “what 
concrete difference will its being true make to anyone‟s actual life? … What, in short, 
is the truth‟s cash-value in experimental terms?  The moment pragmatism asks this 
question, it sees the answer: True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, 
corroborate and verify.  False ideas are those we cannot … The truth of an idea is not a 
stagnant property inherent in it.  Truth happens to an idea.  It becomes true, is made 
true by events. (James, 1975; ix) 
 
Thus, James rejects, a-priori, the realist notion that truth is a property independent of human 
intentionality.  As with coherence theory, which will be discussed next, the pragmatic theory of 
truth avoids the metaphysics of correspondence theory, in that it requires no “God‟s Eye” view for 
a final and complete view of truth.  Rather, a statement is deemed true because it coheres with 
particular systems of belief, and not because it corresponds with an abstracted objective reality.  
Furthermore, that coherence is ultimately measured it terms of how well the idea works within 
those particular systems of belief. 
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Once again, ADHD can provide an effective example.  If the question of the ontological existence 
of ADHD is put to one side (as irrelevant and/or unknowable) then, according to pragmatism, the 
truth of the disorder is determined by some of the questions outlined by James above, focusing 
solely upon what ADHD actually does, or attempts to do; that is, improve the educational 
opportunities of difficult, disruptive, and marginal students.   
 
The Pragmatic Truth Test   
This involves testing whether a statement is true by checking if it works in a practical sense.  This 
test of truth often involves the establishment of a working hypothesis by a process of elimination.  
For example, if a person‟s arms are pink and painful at the end of each day during summer, by a 
process of elimination, any number of possible causes can probably be ruled out—allergies, 
abrasion, dermatological issues, paint—especially if long sleeves and/or sun-block seem to solve 
the problem.  That is, it is true that the pink and painful arms are actually sunburn because this 
works as an explanation. 
 
As has been discussed, some of the principal questions to ask regarding ADHD would include, 
“What is the value of this particular truth in people‟s lives?” as well as the definitive pragmatic 
question of, “Does this truth work?”  Within the logic of Theory 1, given that ADHD was 
originally formulated around the educational needs of a particular kind of at-risk student, there is 
little doubt that it aims to make a concrete contribution to the educational and emotional wellbeing 
of a specific category of child.  Similarly, since the truth of ADHD is be determined by whether 
the category works, it can be argued that the disorder provides a straight-forward workable 
explanation as to why seemingly otherwise healthy and normal children are incapable of behaving 
well in class.  In addition, it could be argued that the apparent success of Ritalin in treating the 
behavioural outcomes of the disorder adds credence to ADHD‟s claim to truth.  That is, since 
Ritalin works as a treatment, it can be argued that ADHD works as an explanation.   
 
A pragmatic test of truth also appears to work for Theory 5, the governmental understanding of 
ADHD, in that it works as an explanation of why so many new disorders are appearing, and at 
such an incredible rate, and why previously untapped areas of human conduct are being opened up 
to pathologisation.  That is, excessive shyness, unpopularity, vagueness, impulsiveness or 
loneliness, to name but a few, are all now likely to be explained in terms of a disorder, at which 
point the organs of intervention and regulation will be put in place, and normalisation will 
commence—more often than not pharmacologically.  This depiction of ADHD also works in that 
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it explains why such disorders seem to be discovered almost exclusively in areas where they pose a 
threat to effective social and educational management.   
 
Coherence Theory 
Statements are made true by other statements. (Olen, 1983: 281) 
 
In addition to pragmatic theory, there is another anti-realist, epistemic approach to the notion of 
truth: coherence theory.  This theory evolved as an attempt to sidestep the metaphysics of 
correspondence theory.  That is, since it can never know whether a statement corresponds to 
external reality, all that can be said is that the statement coheres with a given set of already 
accepted beliefs.  Generally, things we believe to be true form part of a huge, interrelated matrix.  
The truth of a statement is therefore assessed by how well it fits into that matrix—if it dovetails 
well with the ideas in the matrix, it is regarded as true, if not, it is regarded as false.   
 
Of course, the questions arise of  “What counts as coherence?” and “Under what conditions?”  The 
clearest answers to these questions are given by Hilary Putnam (1981), who argues that within an 
anti-realist (or what he refers to as an internalist) understanding of truth, the coherence of any 
given truth-claim should be assessed by an “ideally rational enquirer”, under “epistemically ideal 
conditions”.  Therefore, while still rejecting the existence of absolute truth, this is not to suggest 
that equally valid truths can be formulated for general consumption by the deranged, the deluded 
or the drunk—ie. the alleged coherence of any given truth-claims must still withstand significant 
scrutiny.  Putnam (1981: 50) summarises his position as follows:  
 
“Truth”‟, in an internalist view, is some sort of (idealised) rational acceptability—some 
sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other and with our experiences as those 
experiences are themselves represented in our belief system—and not correspondence 
with mind independent or discourse independent “states of affairs”.   
 
However, in stating that there are no external truths, no absolute facts which exist independent of 
human experience, it is equally false to identify truth with rational acceptability (or its human 
equivalent, the ideally rational inquirer).  The two are not synonymous.  Putnam uses the example 
of the historically changing shape of the earth, pointing out that the earth has not changed for being 
flat to being a sphere over the last 500 years.  Therefore, what remains is an understanding that 
“truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability”, a rational acceptability which is both tensed and 
relative (Putnam, 1981: 51). 
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Anti-realist theories of truth, such as pragmatic theory and coherence theory, are not without their 
critics. For example, it has been argued that they are both unable to account for what would 
otherwise be a central feature of our general understanding of truth, that is, the possibility of there 
being a discrepancy between what we believe to be true, and what actually is true (Horwich, 1990: 
9).  After all, simple believing something to be true, does not necessarily make it so.  However, 
both anti-realist theories would regard this as an invalid criticism; pragmatism, because all truth is 
subject to re-appraisal, and if it works, what difference anyway; and coherence, because of the role 
of the ideally rational inquirer.  The strengths and weaknesses of coherence theory can be thrown 
into greatest relief by applying the coherence truth test.   
 
The Coherence Truth Test  
This involves comparing a mental concept against a set of concepts that are already taken as true.  
Once again, this can be done in a number of ways.  For example, if the statement is, “January is 
generally a hot month,” then the process of determining the veracity of the statement would begin 
by comparing it with any number of other sets of knowledges within a generalised matrix of 
accepted truths.  These might include personal memories, meteorological inputs relating to 
temperatures, menological information concerning the months of the year, geographical 
knowledge relating to the hemispheres, even cultural data about what kinds of events happen in 
January.  If the information in these sets of knowledges is taken to be true, and if the statement 
coheres with those knowledges, then the statement deemed to be true.  Significantly, this forms of 
test is useful for assessing statements where no direct comparison is available, as in the 
correspondence test. 
 
A coherence test of truth would appear to work in Theory 1‟s favour.  The notion of ADHD 
appears to mesh in easily with any number of other sets of accepted beliefs within the truth matrix.  
Taking just two of these: first, ADHD is based upon the premise that some kind of minor brain 
dysfunction results in unwelcome social behaviour, behaviour which had previously been 
categorised as simply as naughtiness/inattentiveness.  This reappraisal coheres readily with a wide 
range of other accepted truths concerning the relationship between specific mental problems and 
undesirable forms of conduct, two examples being bipolar disorder and depressive behaviour, 
schizophrenia and paranoid behaviour.  A second set of truths with which ADHD coheres involves 
the belief that, as part of pushing back the boundaries of ignorance, science is finally discovering 
the real workings of the human mind by uncovering more and more mental disorders.  ADHD fits 
snugly into this triumphalist and teleological understanding of the psychological sciences, and 
coheres with, and adds to, the validity of all the other new disorders.  One problem here is that 
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there are problems of circularity within this logic. Comparing a statement with a broader set of 
beliefs is problematic when that broader set of beliefs turns out to be false or unsupportable.  That 
is, it is circular to argue that ADHD is true because it coheres with the logic underpinning an 
enormous set of other newly-discovered childhood disorders, when the validity of their existence is 
likewise, in part, premised upon the existence of ADHD.  That said, there are any number of other 
knowledges with which ADHD coheres, and through which it gains its validity. 
 
Theory 5‟s governmental understanding of ADHD also fits neatly into the truth matrix comprised 
of accepted historical beliefs and interpretations.  Even those theoretical positions which place 
greater emphasis on other issues, such as the role of political power, or the distribution of wealth, 
would most likely concur with the central premise that categories of difference have a pivotal role 
to play in the management of the modern population.  This understanding of ADHD also dovetails 
into the widely accepted belief that social governance is becoming more and more densely layered, 
and that the web of governmental intelligibility is becoming ever more finely meshed, as reflected 
in the aforementioned fact that the number of these categories/disorders appears to be increasing 
exponentially.   
 
To summarise the three truth tests as applied to Theory 1 and Theory 5: advocates of the disorder 
can argue that ADHD can make a solid claim to veracity when applying pragmatic and coherence 
truth tests, but the case is somewhat weaker when applying a correspondence test.  Likewise, the 
nature of evidence required to support Theory 5 makes the application of the correspondence truth 
test a-priori problematic, but the theory seems to survive well under the pragmatic and coherence 
truth tests.   
 
It is important to point out here that when the veracity of a particular claims or statement is being 
assessed, normally more than one truth test is applied.  Different kinds of claims often require 
testing in different ways, and as can be seen from the two theories relating to ADHD compared 
here, some claims pass one truth test but fail another, which makes allocating the status of truth all 
the more complex and contentious.  Whereas truth test are used in all practical contexts, it could be 
argued that the problems here is a slightly different one. It is generally the case that scientific 
categories require more evidence of their validity than the simple assertion that it just happens to 
work.  After all, advocates of ADHD are making the claim to ontological truth, to truth as 
understood in realist terms, and as such, the apparent pragmatic validity of ADHD may not be 
enough to satisfy its critics. 
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Conclusion 
What is laid down, ordered, factual is never enough to embrace the whole truth:  
life always spills over the rim of every cup (Boris Pasternak) 
 
Having covered the necessary theoretical and empirical ground, it is now possible to address the 
two questions set out in the introduction: first, can Theory 1 and Theory 5 both be true?  Can 
ADHD be both a real disorder and the product of social governance?  If a realist position on truth 
is adopted, then the answer is probably not, although a limited number of philosophers would 
disagree (see Lynch, 1998).  Instead, it is more likely that the choice would have to be made 
between the two truths—Theory 1 and Theory 5—and the less convincing one rejected.  This 
might seem a relatively easy decision with ADHD, since even the scientific community is unsure 
of its status.  However, had the paper been about Dyslexia, as speculated in the introduction, would 
the choice have been the same?—after all, it too is one of the myriad of relatively new learning 
disorders that dot the medical and educational landscape.   
 
In contrast, if an anti-realist position on truth is adopted, there does not seem to be the same kind 
of epistemological problem, both theories can be true, and the social scientists and psychologists 
can stop squabbling with each other.  That is, each theory can function as a truth within its own 
contextual framework, a situation founded in the pluralist logic that reality is not fixed and 
complete, and that facts can only ever reflect given points of view.  As William James observes, 
there was once a time when … 
 
…almost everyone believed that sciences expressed truths that were exact copies of a 
definite code of non-human realities.  But the enormously rapid multiplication of 
theories these days has well-nigh upset the notion of any one of them being a more 
literally objective kind of thing than another.  There are so many geometrics, so many 
logics, so many physical and chemical hypotheses, so many classifications, each of 
them good for so much and yet not good for everything, that the notion that even the 
truest formula may be a human device and not a literal transcription has dawned upon 
us. (James, cited in Lynch, 1998: 1) 
 
This leads on to the second question: and the core of this paper: Is ADHD is a real disorder?  
Needless to say, according to Theory 1 the answer would obviously be “Yes”, although a problem 
here is that by using the term “real”, there is the danger of a-priori adopting the realist position, 
which would then beg the question, and which would lead Theory 5 to conclude that, since ADHD 
does not exist independently of scientific analysis, the answer must be “No”.  However, setting the 
realist model aside, Theory 5 would most likely agree that ADHD does exist, in the sense that the 
scientific community says it does (or at least a significant portion of it) and ultimately that is all 
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that matters.  As has been pointed out during this paper, the production of truth is inexorably tied 
to the right to produce truth, and whereas this right once belonged to religion, it now belongs to 
science.   
 
However, in practical terms, this is far from the end of the matter, and ultimately not for 
philosophical reasons, but rather for exclusively scientific ones.  The case for the truth of ADHD—
Theory 1—is still a long way from being made within the scientific community itself.  There 
appears to be little firm agreement on almost any aspect of the disorder: its prevalence, its 
symptoms, its consequences, its treatment, its boundaries, its aetiology, its longevity, or its 
constituency.  Ontological and epistemological concerns aside, these significant shortcomings 
regarding ADHD render all truth claims as both contingent and provisional.   
 
Karl Popper (1959) made it very clear as to the kind of science he admired, and which he 
considered produced workable knowledge: good science could be easily falsified but no-one would 
be able to do it (citing Einstein‟s work on relativity), bad science would render itself immune to 
falsification, (citing Adler‟s work in psychoanalysis).  Currently, advocates of ADHD are working 
with a category that appears too nebulous even to provide a reasonable and stationary target for 
falsification, and this seems flimsy grounds for the effective production of truth, irrespective of the 
context and the subject matter.  As it stands, Popper would not be impressed.   
 
References 
 
Aristotle. (1956). Metaphysics. London: Dent 
 
Armstrong, T. (1997). The Myth of the A.D.D Child: 50 Ways to Improve Your Child's Behaviour 
and Attention Span Without Drugs, Labels, or Coercion, New York : Plume. 
 
Ayer, A. (1935). “The Criterion of Truth”, Analysis, 3. 
 
Bacon, F. (1952).  “The new organon”, (1620), in R. M. Hutchins, (Ed.), Great Books of the 
Western World: Vol. 30. The Works of Francis Bacon (pp. 107-195) Chicago: 
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.  
 
Bacon, F. (1985). “On Truth”, The Essays, (1601), Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
 
Barkley, R. (2001). Interview regarding Frontline documentary “Medicating Kids”, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/medicating/experts/exist.html, last visited 
20/2/03. 
 
Bierce, A. (1995).  The Devil’s Dictionary, (1911), London: Penguin. 
 
Breggin, P. (1998). Talking Back to Ritalin, Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press. 
 23 
 
Carle, E. (2000). “ADHD for Sale” Psychology Today, 3, p 17. 
 
Chalmers, A. (1976). What’s This Thing Called Science? St Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press. 
 
Christian, J. (1981). Philosophy: An Introduction to the Art of Wondering, New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston. 
 
Collins, N. (1985).  Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, London: 
Sage. 
 
Descartes, R. (1991). “Letter to Marsenne: 16 October 1639‟, in The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes, Vol 3, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
 
Disraeli, B. (1851). House of Commons, 11 Feb.       
 
Feyerabend, P. (1975). Against Method, London: Verso. 
 
Feyerabend, P. (1978).  Science in a Free society, Verso: London. 
 
Feyerabend, P. (1981). Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Foucault, M. (1977).  Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
 
Foucault, M. (1980). “Truth and Power”, in C. Gordon (ed.), Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings 1972-1977 by Michel Foucault, Brighton: Harvester Press. 
 
Frege, G. (1977). „Thoughts‟, in Logical Investigations, (1918), Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Goodman, G. (1992). “ADD: acronym for any dysfunction or difficulty”, Journal of Special 
Education, 26/1, pp. 37-56. 
 
Haldane, J. (1963). Journal of Genetics, 58:464. 
 
Henkin, L. (1966). “Truth and Probability: the voice of American Forum Lectures”, Philosophy of 
Science Series, 4, p. 1. 
 
Holyoake, G. (1902). Sixty Years of an Agitator’s Life, London: Unwin. 
 
Horwich, P. (1990). Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hume, D. (1984).  Treatise of Human Nature, (17  ), London: Penguin. 
 
Jacobs, B. (2002).  Queensland Children at Risk, Brisbane: Youth Affairs Network. 
 
James, W. (1917). Selected Papers on Philosophy, London: Dent and Sons. 
 
James, W. (1975). Pragmatism, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
James, W. (1975). The Meaning of Truth, 1911, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
 24 
Keats, J. (1951). “Ode on a Grecian Urn”, in The Complete Poetry and Selected Prose of John 
Keats,  (ed) H. Briggs, New York: Modern Library. 
 
Kierkegaard, S. (2001). “Philosophical Fragments”, in The Kierkegaard Reader, (ed) J 
Chamberlain and J Rée, Malden: Blackwell. 
 
Kuhn, T. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Lynch, M. (1998). Truth in Context: An Essay on Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge: Bradford. 
 
Magill-Lewis, J. (2000). “Psychotropics and Kids”, Drug Topics, 3, pp. 35-42. 
 
Mulkay, M. (1979). Science and the Sociology of Knowledge, London: George, Allen and Unwin. 
 
Nietzsche, F. (1954). „On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense‟, in The Portable Nietzsche. New 
York: Viking. 
 
Nietzsche, F. (1965).  “Nachlass”, in A Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, New York: MacMillan. 
 
Nietzsche, F. (1967). The Will to Power, (1911), New York: Random House. 
 
Nietzsche, F (1997). Human, All too Human, (1878), Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
 
Olen, J. (1983). Persons and Their World: An Introduction to Philosophy, New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
 
Plato. (1956). Protagorus and Meno, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
 
Plato. (1974).  Theaetetus, Oxford: Clarendons Press. 
 
Plato. (1974). The Republic, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
 
Popper, K. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Hutchinson 
 
Popper K. (1963). Conjectures and Refutations: the Growth of Scientific Knowledge, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
 
Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Rose, N. (1990).  Governing the Soul: the Shaping of the Private Self, London: Routledge. 
 
Russell, B. (1956). “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”, in R. Marsh (ed.) Logic and 
Knowledge, London: Allen and Unwin. 
 
Russell, B. (1983).  The Problems of Philosophy, (1912), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sextus Empiricus. (1994). Outlines of Scepticism.  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tait, G. (2001). “Pathologising Difference, Governing Personality”, Asia-Pacific Journal of 
Teacher Education, 29/1, pp. 93-102.  
 
Whitefield, P. (1999). “Disordered Behaviour and Fuzzy Categories”, Education Links, 59, pp. 22-
25. 
 25 
 
 
